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This paper serves as a conceptual discussion of equity culture and its development 
mechanism. Equity culture is a less popular source of finance in the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) but yet developed in a number of developed economies. The 
way the CEECs will proceed is a dynamic and challenging issue to observe. We graphically 
display ten CEECs from our research sample and four benchmarks in terms of their 
institutional characteristics and thus cumulatively, we portray the status of their financial 
system developments and equity culture creation. The Co-Plot applied to create the exhibits, 
enable us firstly, to identify indicators leading to debt financing and equity financing; and 
secondly, to place individual CEECs not only in terms of their general financial system 
development credibility but also in relation to equity culture development. The presence of an 
efficient bureaucratic system and an institutional system with low corruption levels is a 
necessary condition. Therefore, if a country’s government aims to start building equity 
culture at all levels of its corporate sector, improved quality of the bureaucratic system and 
low levels of corruption may enable them to achieve this. 
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Financial System and Equity Culture Development in Central and Eastern European 
Countries: The Effect of Institutional Environment 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent economic crisis (i.e. the global financial crisis of 2008-2009) has confirmed that 
without adequate access to capital, firms in all types of economies suffer. The fact that the 
financial sector has been unable to provide adequate financing for many firms since 
2008/2009 has resulted in corporate standstill or even declared insolvency of some formerly 
well-performing firms. As a result, most financial analysts and economists agree that the 
ultimate challenge for any economy at the time of such a serious economic crisis is to restore 
financial confidence and stability among all financial sector participants (the firms, investors, 
Government and financial institutions), to enable the adequate flow of capital and to facilitate 
the efficient functioning of different financial systems. 
Capital finance is essential for firm growth and by implication for economic growth 
(Stoian and Filippaios, 2007). This leads to the question of how firms can best finance 
themselves and what types of financial systems are likely to be formed in the future. This is 
particularly relevant for countries with historically weak and underdeveloped financial 
systems, such as the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEECs). 
Limited availability of capital, poor access to finance and low quality financial institutions 
form the characteristics of weak financial systems present in the majority of transition 
countries (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). It is clear that without access to stable and adequate 
financial markets these countries’ ultimate goal of catching up with their more developed 
counterparts is unachievable.  
The current paper investigates the financial systems of the CEECs which until the 
1990s were operating under a State socialist system. In any political establishment, whether 
democratic or socialist, progress can only be achieved if there is economic growth (Kolodko, 
2000). In the late 1980’s, the socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe were 
experiencing serious economic, financial, social and ultimately political difficulties (Stiglitz, 
1995). This resulted in the region’s inability to expand, satisfy its population’s social needs, 
attract investment and boost productivity, and ultimately resulted in the need to change the 
existing centralised political and economic regime.  
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Today, two decades after the start of their transition process from centrally planned to 
market oriented economies, CEECs still have to face many challenges in order to catch up 
with the developed systems of their Western European counterparts and other developed 
nations worldwide. The creation and enhancement of an efficient and sustainable financial 
system is without a doubt one of the key challenges (EBRD, 2006). Indeed, the 
underdeveloped banking system (overwhelmed with low capital, large volumes of non-
performing loans to state enterprises, small branch networks, inexperienced staff and 
management, limited competition, etc.) and an even less developed capital markets system 
(with weak legal infrastructure, non-existent institutional investors, etc.) (Morelli, 2010), both 
legacies of the previous political regime, have impeded the financial liberalisation process 
and thus also the CEECs’ growth and development potential.  
Unlike the CEECs, more advanced economies have successfully adopted one, or the 
combination of, two financial system models (bank-based or equity-based) and have 
accordingly created corporate governance structures, established financial institutions and 
legislative systems which function in support of each individual system (Amable, 2003, 
Morelli, 2009). In an effectively and efficiently functioning bank-based system there is a 
significant presence of banking tradition in a country, with strong historical roots and 
embedded trust within the banking sector (Levine, 2002, Detragiache et al., 2006, Levine and 
Zervos, 1998, Beck and Levine, 2004). On the other hand, the equity-based model requires 
the presence of a strong and developed equity culture in a country (Kim and Kenny, 2007, 
Bekaert et al., 2001, Li, 2007, Bekaert et al., 2002, Smith, 2003). A number of scholars point 
out that in advanced forms of financial systems bank financing is often at some stage 
followed by equity financing (Pagano, 1993, Geschenkron, 1962). Indeed, Smith  (2003) 
observes that bank lending and government-determined allocation of capital are currently 
giving way to private equity financing in many advanced economies. 
 The institutional environment affects the financing decision-making of firms and the 
direction of a financial system development overall (Peng, 2004). Scientific research (Kim 
and Kenny, 2007, Bakker and Gross, 2004) further confirms that the institutional 
environments of the banking oriented financial systems differ from the institutional 
environments of the equity-oriented systems. An equity-based financing system requires an 
institutional system characterised by low corruption, high accountability, policies protecting 
investor rights and an efficient bureaucracy-free system (Smith, 2003, Bekaert et al., 2001). 
Although transparency is also important in the banking system it does not have the same 
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imperative role as we see in the equity-based models. This is mainly because the private 
nature of most by bank financed firms and the traditional bank-client relationships based on 
trust are less transparency-centred (Beck and Levine, 2004, Levine and Zervos, 1998). These 
institutional differences point to the existence of the German-Japanese banking oriented- and 
the Anglo-Saxon equity oriented institutional systems. 
 The key aim of this paper is to explore the effect of institutional environment on 
financial system and more specifically on equity culture development in CEECs. In doing so, 
this paper makes several significant contributions to both theory and practice: Firstly, this 
study  enriches the  debate on the financial system development in transition economies  and 
addresses the calls for more attention to this area of research (Purda, 2008; Hermes and 
Lensink, 2000, Nord, 2000)  and  in particularly the calls for more studies focusing on  equity 
financing  (Smith, 2003, EBRD, 1998).  Secondly, this paper joins an emerging strand of 
literature on the impact of the institutional environment on business  (Henisz and 
Swaminathan, 2008; Peng et al., 2008) and by focusing on the impact of institutional factors 
on financial development in transition economies addresses the call by Bekaert and Harvey 
(2002). Thirdly, this research puts forward policy recommendations for governments and 
international organisations that are concerned with the potential for equity culture 
development. Indeed, The World Bank and The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development have recognised that transition economies as new democratic economies have a 
high growth potential and therefore, have called for more scientific work on the transition 
type of economy (OECD, 2009). 
 To achieve our aim we provide a thorough literature review of the financial system 
development, the creation of equity culture and the effect of the institutional environment on 
both to conceptualise the relationship. We then proceed empirically by adopting a new 
methodology that allows us to graphically display the differences of institutions in the ten 
CEECs and then compare them with four benchmarks (UK and USA on one hand and 
Germany and Japan on the other) discussed above. We provide evidence not only with regard 
to the institutional factors that influence the development of the financial system in the 
CEECs but also highlight those factors that bring specific CEECs closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
(UK and USA) model with a well developed equity culture or closer to the German and 
Japanese model that relies more on the bank financing. 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Next sections provides an in-
depth literature review discussing the key institutional factors that influence financial system 
development and equity culture creation. Section 3 provides the main characteristics of our 
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sample and briefly describes the key attributes. The following, section 4, justifies the 
methodological approach of this study and discusses the co-plot method applied. Section 5 
presents the empirical evidence of our analysis whilst section 6 concludes the paper with 
some policy implications and suggestions for future research. 
2. Financial Development, Equity Culture and Institutions: A Review of the 
Literature  
2.1 The Role of Institutions in Financial System Development 
The link between financial system development and economic growth has been established 
early in the 20th century (Schumpeter, 1911). More recently, a number of financial analysts 
have empirically confirmed that a more developed financial system has a positive impact on 
the economic growth both at the macroeconomic level (King and Levine, 1993, Beck et al., 
2000, Rajan and Zingales, 2003a) as well as at the microeconomic level (Beck et al., 2005, 
La Porta et al., 1997) as financial constraints stemming from a less developed financial 
system can negatively affect growth. Despite the popularity of the topic of financial system 
development in discussions of economic growth, there is still little agreement on how to 
define it and measure it (Levine, 2002). For the purpose of this study we adopt a definition of 
a financial system development as proposed by the World Economic Forum (WEF). It 
defines financial development as the ‘factors, policies and institutions that lead to effective 
financial intermediation and markets, and deep and broad access to capital and financial 
markets’ (WEF, 2008, p. 3). The process of financial development depends, among other 
factors, on how the financial system’s supporting mechanisms in a particular country are 
designed and established (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). This includes the type and role of 
financial institutions, the design of the regulatory and supervisory system, and the role of 
government policies that are related to controlling that particular system (Levine and Zervos, 
1998, Rajan and Zingales, 2003b). 
The efficiency factors that contribute to the development of an advanced financial 
system are of political, economic and institutional nature. Although the role of government as 
a financial service provider or financial regulatory body has been disputed (Beck, 2006), its 
role and contribution to a financial system development has been commented on by many 
(e.g. Strange, 1995, La Porta et al., 1999). This is because financial system development can 
only progress to an advanced level if political forces support and do not go against economic 
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and institutional reforms necessary for such progress. This viewpoint goes in line with  Rajan 
and Zingales’s (2003a) findings who point out that favourable (or unfavourable) political 
outlook on financial development is the main reason for cross-country differences in the 
quality of a financial development. In fact, it is believed that in some less developed countries 
financial system development has been prevented by special country interests (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2000). Scholtens (2000) takes the view that local politics shapes the economic and 
institutional conditions in a country, and through these influences the type of financial 
intermediaries that are able to develop and the level of efficiency they can function at. In a 
more recent assessment of financial systems and their functionalities, Purda (2008) calls for a 
compatibility between economic policies and the existing political economy in a country, 
which encompasses the areas of institutional quality, politics and economics. In our study, we 
follow the view of Scholtens (2000) and account for the political influences through 
institutional indicators.  
Institutional quality, pointing both to legal efficiency and competent corporate 
governance, is a crucial pillar of an effective financial system. The certainty of legal rights of 
borrowers, creditors and other investors can only be secured through an enforcement of 
contracts and their adherence to these. Importantly, the significance of creating a sound 
legislative framework before considering the set-up of a particular financial system (bank-
based or market-based) is according to some scholars (e.g. Monks and Minow, 2001, Levine, 
2002, Kaufmann et al., 2000) essential at the early stages of a country’s financial system 
development. Countries with good investor protection laws, competition laws and proper 
disclosure of information have financial systems represented by larger and broader financial 
markets which means better accessibility to external finance for individual firms (La Porta et 
al., 1997, Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Moreover, good governance practices in the financial 
and corporate sectors are critical for the development of an effective financial system 
(Kaufmann et al., 2000, La Porta et al., 1999). The studies of Klapper and Love (2004) and 
Francis et al. (2005) find that the quality of corporate governance is positively related to 
growth opportunities of firms and their need for external financing. Simply put, governance 
provides assurance that the market is honest, that investors make decisions based on reliable 
information and that management is running the enterprise for the stakeholders’ benefit 
(Monks and Minow, 2001). Committing to better corporate practices might not be easy in less 
developed economies and in countries with poor state investor protection as the mechanisms 
to do so might not be present or are too expensive (Doidge et al., 2007). Firms that have an 
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access to foreign markets are less dependent on the progression of their domestic financial 
systems and often if they pursue better corporate practices, it may be because of the foreign 
country governance requirements. Drawing on the earlier literature we consider the nature of 
an institutional system to be an essential determinant for the type of a financial system 
developed in a country and we investigate the specific institutional factors that are associated 
with equity culture development 
 
2.2 Equity Culture and Transition Economies 
For the development of an equity-based financial system it is necessary that an equity culture 
is created (Myners, 2001). It can be said that equity culture develops alongside an equity-
based financial system. Existing literature offers several definitions of the phenomenon of an 
equity culture. Some claim that equity culture denotes shared ownership receptive by firms 
and stock company formation (Bekaert et al., 2002). Others suggests that a solid equity 
culture means that firms are able to finance their business activities through financial assets 
of which share investments account for a significant proportion (Beck and Levine, 2004). 
Equity culture is also defined as ‘the route to a wider shareholder democracy’ (Myners, 2001) 
or even seen as an expansion of share ownership by individuals (Bilias et al., 2009). 
Claessens (1995) in his earlier work states that equity culture means a market economy that 
has a corporate sector in which individuals are enabled to participate. In some works, 
however, an exact definition of equity culture is missing and authors refer to a ‘bundle’ of 
definitions. For instance, Smith (2003) first defines the equity culture as the culture of stock 
markets themselves. Then he implies that equity culture actually represents public willingness 
to invest in stocks.  This confuses the reader. To avoid confusion, for the purpose of this 
study, we draw on these earlier works yet offer our own definition as we see equity culture as 
a financing culture adopted by a country’s corporate sector implying its preference for equity-
based financing (built on the principle of wealth creation through shared ownership) subject 
to feasible market conditions.  
 Transition economies are characterised by their bank-based financial systems (Gehrke 
and Knell, 1992). The fact that equity financing has not been extremely successful as a source 
of capital acquirement in transition countries is not surprising. The former centrally planned 
systems embedded constraints and simply did not allow for the development of equity 
financing. It is believed that the development of equity financing as an equal form to debt 
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financing has been hindered due to special country interests (Stiglitz, 1999). Indeed, equity 
culture development supporters have had to overcome massive obstacles, such as mistrust of 
stock exchanges, nationalistic aversion to adopting ‘Anglo-Saxon’ financial techniques and 
resistance to sound corporate practices on which a viable public equity market depends 
(Smith, 2003).  
Specifically, in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, the former 
communist regimes opposed the development of stock markets, the primary financial 
intermediaries of equity-based financing, and thus their level of development in 1989 was 
comparable to the British stock markets in the 19th century (Hermes and Lensink, 2000). 
Indeed, only a small part of corporate investments was financed by equity (Kornai, 2006). As 
a result of the narrow scope of financial markets in Central and Eastern Europe, capital 
providers have associated firm financing in these transition countries with higher risk than in 
other more developed economies (Wyplozs, 2002). The disregard for transparency, medium 
to high levels of bankruptcy and lack of adequate business expertise and experience have 
been identified as the main reasons for this (Bakker and Gross, 2004). Despite considerable 
advances over the last decade, existing European financial markets are still functioning below 
their potential (EBRD, 2006). As a result, European development and particularly the 
transition EU economies have been losing out on jobs and growth. Economists agree that the 
main reason for this is the fragmentation of these markets which is driven by domestic bias, 
inefficient regulation and risk-averse culture. This results in an inability of many funds to 
become sufficiently specialised and to achieve critical mass within a (short) timescale (i.e. 
attracting large number of companies and investors). Therefore, the majority of firms in the 
CEECs have preferred traditional ways of financing such as debt financing, leasing and 
renting. 
However, recent views point out that a combination of global and region-specific 
factors gives an indication that there may be a realistic potential for equity culture 
development in transition economies (Segal, 2009). Firstly, the recent financial crisis 
highlighted a number of ‘cracks’ in the current banking sector and the issues related to the 
corporate sector’s over-dependence on it. Secondly, the economic improvement demonstrated 
in the majority of transition economies prior to the financial crisis (e.g. removed restrictions 
on foreign ownership, improved accounting and information standards) and in many cases the 
transition countries’ ability to limit the negative consequences caused by the financial crisis 
have been identified as reasons to believe that the ‘promotion’ of equity financing as a direct 
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competitor to debt could be plausible (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Cumulatively, these 
events could be seen as potential catalysts for the development of an equity culture in 
transition economies.  
In the case of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe the following has 
to be noted. Firstly, the reform process in the CEECs is still ongoing. Although the CEECs 
succeeded in complying with the economic requirements imposed upon them by the 
European Union (EU), the financial liberalisation process is far from being finished (EBRD, 
2009). This provides an opportunity for correct economic policy shaping which could be 
potentially geared towards supporting an equity culture in these countries. Secondly, events 
such as privatisation of formerly state owned businesses, the establishment of the Euro 
currency (in some of the CEECs) and the shift in the pension systems from state-owned to 
individual retirement accounts and defined contribution pension plans (just to name a few) 
have prompted the ‘equity culture’ supporters to raise their hopes. Thirdly, the substitution of 
top-down corporate governance systems based on central planning with corporate governance 
systems that react to and base their decisions upon market signals is seen by some as a signal 
for the change of direction of these countries’ financial systems (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). 
Fourthly, the increased interest of foreign investors in the CEE region has a significant 
impact as ‘equity culture’ emerges where a strong investor base is. The increased interest of 
the foreign investors has been prompted by the downturn in the mature equity markets. 
Investors are therefore looking for new and exciting markets with substantial growth and 
potential. The CEECs might not be the centre of their investment activities (with the BRIC 
countries taking the prime) but the spill-over effect may have an economic policy changing 
impact. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the majority of the corporate sector in the 
CEECs is dissatisfied with the financing services their financial systems offer (EBRD, 
2008b). Indeed, a strong increase in the demand for sophisticated financial services in the 
rapidly expanding economies of Central and Eastern Europe has been noted (EBRD, 2006). 
Many firms in the CEECs feel that the limited availability of finance is the major constraint 
to their growth and development as many have their bank loan applications declined or 
receive only part of what they requested (Scholtens, 2000). Furthermore, due to limited 
competition at the local level, banks are able to overcharge for their capital raising services, 
with the effect of locking companies into long-term relationships. The banking sector also has 
started to require an increased amount of information on business propositions before 
granting loans. This trend could remove an advantage of bank finance (because it was quick 
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and easy to arrange). Klapper et al. (2002) find that the main sources of dissatisfaction firms 
express are red tape, poor services, excessive bank charges and the inappropriateness of 
solutions offered.  
From the research perspective, international authorities (e.g. The World Bank, The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) have recognised that transition 
economies as new democratic economies have a high growth potential and therefore, have 
called for more scientific work on the transition type of economy (OECD, 2009). Indeed, 
since the transition process started, financial systems in these countries have started to be 
analysed, transition processes in individual countries have been evaluated and some 
downfalls of the existing systems rooted in the inherited legacy of the previous regime have 
been identified (Bakker and Gross, 2004, Underhill, 1995, Doyle and Walsh, 2005). 
However, a number of authors have identified more areas that need further clarification and 
gaps that require additional research.  
For instance, Purda (2008) points out that there is a need for further research on 
transition countries (e.g. transition economies of the CEECs) as ‘caution should be used in 
extending the results from research on financial systems of developed economies with well-
functioning financial markets to the context of transition and post-transition countries’. 
Bekaert and Harvey (2002) stress the requirement for a better understanding of the 
combination of factors (macro-economic and institutional) influencing financial system 
reforms in transition markets and Klapper and Love (2003) emphasise the need to re-focus 
the research in transition economies from country-level to firm-level, or a combination of 
these two levels. Pinkowitz et al. (2002) highlight the need to analyse corporate governance 
mechanisms when assessing financing choices of firms, in particular equity capital, in 
transition economies. Fisher et al. (1997) and later on Kornai (2006) add at the corporate 
level, the motivations behind firm financing choices should be more closely examined. 
Bakker and Gross (2004) call for more attention specifically to the transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe as ‘these markets are particularly interesting since they provide 
us with a number of comparable, yet in many interesting respects, different cases’. Also, the 
need to provide empirical knowledge on factors affecting the CEECs’ future financial 
systems’ developments and direction has been accentuated by many (e.g. Hermes and 
Lensink, 2000, Nord, 2000) with some particularly stressing the importance of an assessment 
from the equity financing perspective (Smith, 2003, EBRD, 1998). However, to our 
knowledge, in the case of the transition literature, the attention to equity culture as a 
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phenomenon coexisting in a financial system with a strong capital market sector, the effect of 
its limited existence in the transition economies and viable suggestions for its possible 
development have been neglected. 
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
In our research, to identify the relationship between financial system and equity culture 
development and the institutional environment, we adopt a quantitative approach and use data 
selected from various secondary sources. To investigate institutional environments of 
individual countries we use data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a 
valuable source of data on institutional quality that has been used in previous investigations 
on the impact of institutions on business in transition economies (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008; 
Filippaios and Stoian, 2007). Then, to investigate the institutional environments in the 
CEECs even deeper we examine the EBRD transition indicators database. These indicators 
have been used consistently in the EBRD Transition Reports (1998, 2006, 2008, 2009) to 
highlight the CEECs’ progress in their process of transition to market economy and have also 
been included in various studies on business in transition economies (Stoian and Vickerman, 
2005; Bevan et al., 2004).  
We first provide an overview of our sample and create CEECs’ profiles on the status of their 
financial system developments with the focus on equity culture creation. We then apply in the 
next section a, relatively new, clustering method – the Co-Plot method (Gilady et al., 1996, 
Raveh, 2000a, Talby et al., 1999), which enables us to observe the positioning of individual 
CEECs in relation to each other and four benchmarks – Germany, Japan, UK and USA on a 
two-dimensional scale and to find patterns with respect to the impact of institutional factors 
on equity culture development in the CEECs.  
 As discussed in detail in the literature review, the institutional environment facilitates 
or hinders the development of a specific financial system. While equity-based systems 
require institutional systems which guarantee the protection of individual shareholders, 
efficient bureaucracy and low corruption leading towards high transparency, the bank-based 
models necessitate the presence of institutional reforms and policies geared towards the co-
ordination within the banking sector and its regulation. To assess the institutional quality in 
our sample countries, as we mentioned above, we examine two sets of data. Firstly, we 
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employ the political risk components of ICRG institutional data, which enables us to assess 
the institutional quality of both the CEECs and the benchmarks. Secondly, to consider the 
institutional progress specifically in the transition countries, we include a smaller set of 
EBRD transition indicators in our analysis. 
The first set of variables (Government stability, Socioeconomic conditions and 
Investment profile) can have a minimum number of 0 points assigned and a maximum 12 
whereas the remaining variables can have a minimum number of 0 points assigned but 
maximum 6. In every case the lower the risk point total, the higher the risk, and the higher the 
risk point total, the lower the risk. Government stability is a measure of a government’s unity, 
legislative strength and popular support. Socioeconomic conditions evaluate socio-economic 
pressures at work (in particular unemployment, consumer confidence, poverty) that could 
constrain government action or lead to social dissatisfaction. Investment profile assesses 
factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political social or 
financial risk components (in particular contract viability, profits repatriation, payment 
delays). Corruption measures a political threat to investment as it can distort economic and 
financial environments, reduce the efficiency of a government and businesses and introduce 
instability into the organisational processes. Law and order comprises two subcomponents 
(‘law’ and ‘order’). While the former assesses the strength and impartiality of a country’s 
legal system, the latter is concerned with the application of law and effective sanctioning. 
Democratic accountability reflects on the type of governance employed in each country. 
ICRG identifies five different types of governance (alternating democracy, dominated 
democracy, de facto one-party state, the jury one-party state, autarchy) and assigns the 
highest number of risk points to alternating democracies (low risk) and the lowest number of 
risk points to autarchies (high risk). Bureaucracy quality is another indicator of a country’s 
institutional strength. Countries demonstrating high points on this variable run bureaucracy 
systems independent from political pressures with established effective bureaucratic 
mechanisms.  
For the assessment of the institutional quality in the transition economies we also apply 
transition indicators from EBRD as follows: Large scale privatisation (an indicator on the 
process of transferring state ownership of large firms into private hands), Small scale 
privatisation (an indicator on the process of transferring state ownership of small firms into 
private hands), Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation (an indicator on the progress 
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of banking laws and regulation), Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (an 
indicator on the progress of securities laws and regulation), Governance an enterprise 
restructuring (an indicator on the progress of corporate governance). Individual scores 
indicate the following:  A score lower than 1.5 – a country has undergone only a few reforms 
(achieved limited progress), a score between 1.5<2.5 – a country has improved its position 
moderately (achieved moderate progress), a score between 2.5<3.5 – a country has 
demonstrated some significant actions (achieved significant progress), a score between 
3.5<4.5 – a country has experienced a substantial improvement (achieved substantial 
progress), a score higher than 4.5 – a country has reached the levels of advanced economies 
(achieved a progress comparable to advanced economies).  
 As a first step we apply ANOVA to assess the variance of institutional data for the 
CEECs and our four benchmarks. We find that in the case of the CEECs all groups have the 
probability level at 1% level which suggests that data differs substantially among individual 
countries for the period under examination (1996 – 2008). The same significance level is 
present in most observations for the benchmarks’ group with three exceptions: Government 
stability, Investment profile and Bureaucracy quality.  
The ANOVA table (Table 1) displays very similar levels for the developed countries, 
with the UK and USA performing slightly better on the indicators of law and order, 
corruption and bureaucracy quality. The CEECs’ group institutional quality indicators are on 
average lower than those of our four benchmarks with Bulgaria and Romania displaying the 
lowest values in most cases. Interestingly, Estonia scores on average lower on the variable of 













Table 1: ANOVA Table: Indicators of Institutional Quality 
 
Source: ICRG (2001) and Author’s ANOVA performed in STATA. 
The ANOVA table (Table 2) of the transition institutional indicators indicates that there 
are significant differences among the CEECs as all indicators are significant at 1% level 
(Table 2). While Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia’s average values for the 
institutional data are the highest indicating a substantial improvement of the institutional 
indicators, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia are the worst performing countries in the group. 
In particular, Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary perform the best on the indicator of large 
scale privatisation, and Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia show the highest values on 
the indicator of small scale privatisation. In terms of the banking reform we observe that 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia demonstrate a proactive reform approach. On the other 
hand, the indicator of the presence of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 













       
No. Country Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
1 Bulgaria 8.36 3.81 10.29 2.71 3.85 5.24  2.00
2 Czech Rep 7.37 7.18 10.18 3.21 5.15 5.29  3.00
3 Estonia 8.92 6.87 9.93 3.54 4.00 5.08  2.61
5 Hungary 8.33 6.19 10.49 3.78 4.64 5.88  3.59
7 Latvia 8.76 5.85 10.01 2.28 4.92 5.00  2.38
8 Lithuania 7.91 6.51 10.01 2.51 4.00 5.30  2.38
9 Poland 7.89 5.38 10.46 3.08 4.41 5.88  3.05
10 Romania 8.34 4.40 8.33 2.67 4.24 5.78  1.00
11 Slovakia 8.07 6.86 9.97 3.00 4.38 5.56  3.06
12 Slovenia 9.63 6.51 10.47 3.28 4.67 5.05  3.00
Total 8.36 5.96 10.01 3.01 4.43 5.41  2.61
F statistics 3.49 15.27 2.65 5.28 10.20 10.00 200.43
Prob > F 0.0007  0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 Germany 8.94 9.98 11.14 4.21 5.36 5.30  3.97
6 Japan 8.89 8.88 10.82 3.33 5.31 5.10  3.97
13 UK 9.12 7.51 9.67 4.59 5.83 5.84  4.23
14 USA 9.39 8.17 10.53 4.67 5.48 5.82  4.00
Total 9.09 8.63 10.54 4.20 5.50 5.52  3.99
F statistics 0.32 12.60 1.64 17.02 3.57 15.74 1.6







Table 2: ANOVA Table: Transition Indicators of Institutional Quality 
 
Source: EBRD (2008a) and Author’s ANOVA performed in STATA. 
 
4. Methodology 
Proceeding a step further into examining the relationship between institutional environment 
and financial system and equity culture development we apply a co-plot methodology. 
Classical multivariate statistical analysis methods, such as the Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA), Correspondence Analysis (CA) or Multidimensional Scaling (MDS), analyse 
variables and observations separately (Talby et al., 1999). However, a relatively new 
clustering method designed for multi-criteria analysis – the Co-Plot method – has the 
advantage of analysing variables and observations simultaneously and in a simple manner 
(Raveh, 2000b, Segev et al., 1990, Raveh, 2000a). The method produces three results. Firstly, 
it shows similarity among data (i.e. decision-making units – DMUs) by the composite of all 
criteria (i.e. variables) involved; secondly, it gives the structure of correlations among the 
variables; and thirdly, it provides mutual relationships between the data and the variables 
(Raveh, 2000a).  
The Co-Plot method has been applied widely: in an exploratory study of national versus 
corporate cultural fit in mergers and acquisitions (Weber et al., 1996), in an analysis of the 














         
No. Country Mean Mean  Mean Mean Mean
1 Bulgaria 3.51 3.57 3.16 2.28 2.46
2 Czech Rep 4.00 3.23 3.92 2.85 4.30
3 Estonia 4.00 4.33 3.69 3.18 3.31
5 Hungary 4.00 4.30 3.18 3.64 3.38
7 Latvia 3.33 4.23 3.41 2.67 2.85
8 Lithuania 3.49 4.25 3.26 2.59 2.87
9 Poland 3.30 4.33 3.38 3.54 3.31
10 Romania 3.23 3.57 2.85 2.23 2.18
11 Slovakia 3.92 4.33 3.23 3.05 3.23
12 Slovenia 2.97 4.33 3.25 2.70 2.85
Total 3.58 4.05 3.33 2.87 3.07
F statistics  19.34 88.04 9.28 28.41 75.40







2000a), in a comparative study of the Greek banking system (Raveh, 2000b), and as an 
exploratory study for suggesting a methodology for presenting data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) graphically (Adler and Raveh, 2008). The application of the Co-Plot method for the 
analysis of the structure of the MBA programmes in the UK and the USA (Paucar-Caceres 
and Thorpe, 2005, Segev et al., 1990) has been recently criticised by Mar-Molinero and 
Mingers (2007). Their findings point out that the Co-Plot method is inappropriate for 
zero/one type (i.e. dichotomous) variables. Our study does not contain such type of variable 
and therefore, we deem the Co-Plot method viable for our considerations. 
The Co-Plot is a graphical display technique useful for visual inspection of data 
matrices such as Xn×k. The data – the decision-making units (DMUs) are displayed as n points 
and the variables are shown as k arrows relative to the same axis and origin. Co-Plot records 
the observations in a manner that similar DMUs are positioned closely on the map. DMUs 
belonging to the same group (cluster) possess similar characteristics and behave similarly. 
The Co-Plot technique enables the simultaneous study of DMUs and variables by 
sequentially superimposing two graphs – one for points (i.e. DMUs) and the other one for 
arrows (i.e. variables) (Adler and Raveh, 2008). The further an observation is located along a 
particular arrow, the more efficient the DMU is with respect to that ratio. In addition, Co-Plot 
also identifies extreme outliers. Raveh (2000a) points out that these can be a sign of data 
measurement errors, lack of homogeneity amongst observations or they can be used to 
identify unnecessary variables.  
 Co-Plot has four stages: two preliminary treatments of the data matrix Xn×k   – the 
standardisation of data and the measurement of distance between cases; and two subsequent 
stages – the production of a two-dimensional representation of the data and the drawing of 
the variables into the space of the observations. A brief methodological explanation follows2.  
a) The Standardisation of Data 
In order for the variables to be treated equally, Xn×k  is normalised into Zn×k. The elements of 
Zn×k are deviations from column means (x..j ) divided by their standard deviations ( Sj ): 
Zij = (xij – xj)) / Sj 
b) The Measurement of Distance between Cases 
                                                            
2For a detailed Co-Plot methodology see Raveh (2000a), Raveh (2000b) and Adler and Raveh (2008).   
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In this stage a measure of dissimilarity Dil ≥ 0 between each pair of observations (rows of 
Zn×k) is chosen. A symmetrical n × n matrix ( Dil ) is produced from all the different pairs of 
observations. The city-block distance (i.e. the sum of absolute deviations) is used as a 
measure of dissimilarity: 
Dil  = ∑  │Zij – Zlj │ 
c) The Creation of a Two-Dimensional Representation of the Data using the MDS Method 
The matrix Dil is recorded using the Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) method. The 
algorithm produced by this method plots the matrix Dil into Euclidean space in such a way 
that similar observations (i.e. observations with a small dissimilarity between them) are close 
to each other on the Co-Plot, and the dissimilar observations are distant from each other on 
the Co-Plot map.  
Co-Plot uses Guttman’s (1968) Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) out of the group of 
MDS methods. SSA uses the coefficient of alienation θ as a measure of goodness-of-fit. The 
coefficient of alienation determines the quality of the two-dimensional Co-Plot map. The 
smaller the coefficient, the better the output; and all values under 0.15 are deemed good 
(Adler and Raveh, 2008). 
d) The Presentation of Variables into the Space of Observations 
In the last stage of the Co-Plot method, variables k are displayed on the Euclidean space 
obtained in stage 3. Talby et al. (1999) state that this is the most interesting part of Co-Plot. 
Here, each variable k is represented by an arrow j. The arrows emerge from the centre of 
gravity of the n points. The maximal correlation between the actual values of the variables 
and their projections on the arrow determine the direction of the arrow. The length of the 
arrows is undefined. Arrows associated with highly correlated variables will point to the same 
or similar direction. Furthermore, individual observations with a high value in a particular 
variable will be positioned around the space where the arrow points to, while observations 
with low value in that particular variable will be at the other side of the Co-Plot map.  
Furthermore, in this stage, k individual goodness-of-fit measures are obtained for each 
of the k variables separately. These are the magnitudes of the k maximal correlations. The 





low correlations do not fit into the graphical display, and therefore, have to be removed. 
Raveh (2000a) states that the higher the variable’s correlation, the better the variable’s arrow 
represents the direction and the order for the projections of the n points along the rotated axis. 
This also points to the high explanatory power of such variables if they are used together to 
form a cluster.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section benchmarks and clusters the CEECs with regard to their financial system 
development. We focus on the examination of conditions that contribute to the development 
of an equity culture. We apply a relatively new clustering method, discussed in detail in the 
previous section, the Co-Plot method (Gilady et al., 1996, Raveh, 2000a, Talby et al., 1999), 
which enables us to observe on a two-dimensional scale the positioning of individual CEECs 
in relation to each other and four benchmarks – Germany, Japan, UK and USA. This method 
enables us to observe the process of development of various institutional factors affecting 
equity culture in the CEECs as we examine several years in the 1996 – 2008 period.  
 In order to present the evolution of clusters in a robust yet reader-friendly way for a 
continuous period of twelve years we pick only four years, i.e. 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008. 
The justification for the selection of these specific years is the following: Firstly, year 1996 is 
the first year of our research period. Transition literature (Brown, 1999, Lavigne, 1999, 
Stiglitz, 1997) suggests that despite the fact that the political transition took place in the early 
1990s, institutional transformation and system democratisation was in 1996 considered to be 
still in its early days. Secondly, year 2000, a mark of a transitional decade when CEECs were 
actively preparing to join the European Union (EU) by increasing the transparency of their 
economic policymaking and financial institutions and strengthen their financial systems 
overall (Nord, 2000). In the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki European Council all CEECs 
were confirmed to join the EU in the future, and therefore they were making efforts to 
progress towards reforms (Stoian, 2004). Djankov and Murrell (2002) also point out that 
2000 was a year of increased trade activity as foreign direct investment (FDI) levels went up 
across the Central and Eastern European (hereafter CEE) region. Thirdly, year 2004 was the 
year of EU’s enlargement eastwards.  Eight CEECs joined the EU and two more were 
actively preparing to enter in the three coming years. Lastly, year 2008 is the last year of our 
research period. By 2008 all CEECs have become EU members and have accomplished all 
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the major transition reforms as directed by the EU (Schwab and Porter, 2008). In this year, 
the Czech Republic – as the first CEEC – was taken off the list of transition countries and 
was awarded a status of a developed European economy. This is also the last year for which 
we have consistent data available. 
 
5.1 Quality of the Institutional Environment 
We examine data on institutional quality in the CEECs and the four benchmarks. From the 
ICRG database we select seven institutional variables that we see relevant in evaluating 
financial system development and an equity culture development. We expect these variables 
to demonstrate institutional differences between those that support the existence of equity-
based system and those that facilitate the functioning of bank-based financial systems: We 
choose the indicators of Government stability (i1), Socioeconomic conditions (i2), Investment 
profile – (i3), Corruption (i4), Law and order (i5), Democratic accountability (i6), 
Bureaucracy quality  (i7) to distinguish between different types of institutional environments 
with the liberal market institutional environment and co-ordinated market institutional 
environments being the two differentiating institutional prototypes.  
 We evaluate the total set of n = 14 countries with measurements on i = 7 variables for 
each individual year of the 1996-2008 period (Fig. 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively). The raw data, a 
X14 ×7 matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With all 14 countries the coefficient of alienation is 0.14 
for years 1996, 2000 and 2008, and 0.15 for year 2004 indicating a reliability of 85 percent 
and above. The average of correlations is 0.79 which signals a positive contribution of all 













Fig. 1. Quality of Institutions 1996 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Figure 2. Quality of Institutions 2000 
 




Figure 3. Quality of Institutions 2004 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Figure 4. Quality of Institutions 2008 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
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 We find that Co-Plots exhibit several clusters for the 1996-2008 period. Although our 
four benchmarks are positioned in every year of observation on the same side of the graphical 
display, in no time observation they form a single cluster. This is what we expected as it is a 
proof of a presence of differing institutional systems in the benchmark countries. The UK and 
the USA are grouped together and this cluster exhibits high values for law and order, 
corruption and bureaucracy quality – three prerequisites of institutional transparency. 
Germany and Japan display slightly lower values on the same attributes and form a cluster on 
their own. Furthermore, the second cluster of Germany and Japan also performs better on 
variables displaying better socio-economic conditions and a higher investment profile. This is 
consistent with the identification of institutional characteristics in the Varieties of Capitalism 
theory. 
Within the CEEC’s group there are variations not only in terms of the overall quality of their 
institutional environments but also relating to which group of benchmarks (UK and USA or 
Germany and Japan) individual CEECs follow. Firstly, the Czech Republic is in 1996 the best 
performer on institutional variables in comparison to other CEECs. The values on democratic 
accountability and bureaucracy quality are especially high. The investment profile indicator 
also remains one of the strongest among the CEECs for the rest of the research period. 
Similarly, Hungary displays in 1996 the presence of a reputable legal system, by 2000 the 
corruption levels improve and by 2004 democratic accountability achieves higher values. By 
2008, due to its improvement in corruption and the increased levels of democratic 
accountability, Hungary secures a position of one of the better institutionally performing 
CEECs. From the institutional quality perspective the ascending trend in these two CEECs 
suggest the presence of an institutional environment feasible for the development of an 
advanced financial system. However, while the Czech Republic seems to follow the path of 
Germany in terms of its institutional characteristics, Hungary’s positioning closer to the UK 
suggests a different trend of an institutional development.    
Secondly, despite the fact that in 1996 Slovakia and Poland are far from being co-
members of one cluster (Poland displays average values for the majority of institutional 
variables while Slovakia was an underperformer) by 2000 these two countries join the same 
cluster characterised by high to above average values for democratic accountability. By 2008, 
however, the position of this cluster moves closer to the centre of gravity suggesting the 
presence of more average values across all chosen institutional variables. Although the 
indicators of democratic accountability and corruption suggest an improvement of the 
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institutional environment and position these two CEECs to the direction of the UK’s 
institutional system, the low quality of bureaucracy and average levels for the law and order 
indicator do not support its positioning as close to this benchmark as we saw in the case of 
Hungary. 
Thirdly, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia are interchangeably joining and 
leaving mutual clusters. Co-Plot adjusted to examine the CEECs without the direct 
comparison to the benchmarks reveals a closer position of two countries in particular: Estonia 
and Slovenia. According to the graphical display the corruption levels are lower compared to 
Latvia and Lithuania and the bureaucracy quality has scored better when compared again to 
the same two countries. This suggests an improvement of institutional quality in Estonia and 
Slovenia and institutional stagnation in Latvia and Lithuania. Therefore, from the institutional 
perspective point of view, Estonia and Slovenia appear to have an institutional advantage 
over Latvia and Lithuania. The same graphical display suggests Estonia following path 
similar to Slovakia, Poland and Hungary (benchmarks UK and USA) and Slovenia following 
the path of Czech Republic (benchmarks Germany and Japan). 
Fourthly, Bulgaria and Romania are the weakest performers on institutional indicators. 
This suggests a limited improvement of the institutional environment in these countries. 
Firms seeking equity financing in these two countries face high transaction costs due to the 
low institutional quality. Therefore, advanced sources of financing, such as equity seem to be 
an unfeasible option to most Bulgarian and Romanian firms.  
5.2 Transition Data on the Quality of Institutions 
In this section more institutional data related to the transition process is examined to 
supplement the institutional environment analysis performed above. The EBRD transition 
data on the progress of the institutional advancement of the CEECs provides information on: 
Large scale privatisation (i8), Small scale privatisation (i9), Banking reform & interest rate 
liberalisation (i10), Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions (i11), Governance 
and enterprise restructuring (i12). Privatisation, FDI, financial liberalisation and corporate 
governance factors  vastly shape the characteristics of an institutional environment in 
transition economies (Choi and Jeon, 2007) and therefore play a vital role in our assessment 
of the quality of the institutional environment in the CEECs. These EBRD institutional 
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indicators enrich our discussion on the different varieties of institutional systems that are the 
reason for and continue developing alongside bank-based and equity based financial systems. 
 In this case we evaluate the total set of n = 10 CEECs (as there are no relevant data 
available for our four benchmarks) with measurements on i = 5 transition variables for each 
individual year (Fig. 5, 6, 7, 8). The raw data, an X10 ×5 matrix is submitted to Co-plot. With 
all 10 countries the coefficient of alienation is 0.11 for years 1996 and 2008, 0.07 for year 
2000 and 0.13 for year 2004 indicating a reliability of 87 percent and above. The average of 
correlations is 0.85 which indicates a positive contribution of all four variables.  
Fig. 5. Quality of Institutions (Transition Data) 1996                    
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations. 
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Fig. 6. Quality of Institutions (Transition Data) 2000 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations. 
 
Fig. 7. Quality of Institutions (Transition Data) 2004 
 
 




Fig. 8. Quality of Institutions (Transition Data) 2008 
 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations. 
 The Co-Plot display confirms that Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland are 
the strongest performers on transitional-institutional indicators. Czech Republic and Poland 
do not belong to the same cluster as Hungary and Estonia. While the former exhibits a higher 
proportion of large scale privatisation in all time observations than any other of these four 
CEECs and also scores high on the governance and enterprise restructuring indicator, the 
latter performs extremely well on the small scale indicator in 1996 but other indicators start 
performing better after 2000. In the case of Hungary and Estonia small scale privatisation is 
prevalent and a steady performance of all the other indicators is present since 1996. 
Czech Republic’s large scale privatisation efforts result in performance typical of 
advanced industrial economies where more than 75 per cent of enterprise assets are in private 
hands with effectively functioning corporate governance (EBRD Transition Report, 2008). If 
these ‘private hands’ have a foreign nature, the Czech government statistical data (Czech 
Republic Statistical Office, 2008) states that they come from Germany, Italy, Austria, the 
USA and France (the particular order applies). Hungary and Estonia, and Poland, on the other 
hand, perform better on the small scale privatisation. In these countries the privatisation of 
small companies with tradable ownership rights is complete by 1996 and there is no state 
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ownership of state enterprises by 2000. By the end of the same year, more than 50 percent of 
state-owned enterprises are in private hands and there is also an improvement in corporate 
governance. Furthermore, by year 2004 prudential supervision and regulation are in place 
with significant lending to private businesses and significant presence of private banks.  By 
2008 also substantial financial deepening is noted (EBRD Transition Report, 2008).  
Based on the above information we can deduce that Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia 
and Poland progressed better in their transition process in terms of their institutional 
environments than other CEECs from our research sample. A growing institutional support 
for the banking sector together with a prevalent source of FDI from host countries known for 
their bank oriented financial systems (e.g. Germany, Austria, Italy) can be identified as 
partial reasons for a bank oriented systems in these CEECs. However, in the case of Hungary 
and Estonia a strong presence of non-bank financial institutions could be a sign of a growing 
demand for other than bank financing and thus the sound banking sector could be seen just as 
a preparation for the entry of a more advanced form of corporate financing - equity financing. 
Therefore, at this stage, we maintain that the developed stage of the institutional sectors in 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia serves as a predisposition for sound financial systems 
development, whether bank or equity oriented.  
Although the other four CEECs - Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia do not form 
one single cluster in any observations, they interchangeably become cluster co-members in 
different years and remain in a close position on the graphical display. These countries share 
the characteristics of an advanced small scale privatisation with privatised firms possessing 
individual ownership rights (EBRD, 2008b). By 2000 all four countries make substantial 
progress in the establishment of bank solvency and in the framework for prudential 
supervision and regulation. In this year the differences in institutional transition become more 
visible between these four countries. While Slovenia stagnates in the transition and displays 
the same levels achieved in 2000 until 2008, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia make a better 
progress. While these three countries improve on the banking reform and interest rate 
liberalisation indicator by achieving a full interest rate liberalisation and significant bank 
lending to private enterprises, two of them also perform better in another way. In Lithuania 
and Slovakia, in addition to a growing regulatory framework for bank financing, the non-
bank financial institutions, such as investment funds and private insurance companies start 
emerging and an associated regulatory framework is formed. 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia exhibit a good effort in small scale 
privatisation. However, large scale privatisation ‘fights’ major unresolved issues regarding 
corporate governance. The transition process of institutional conditions necessary for the 
development of a sound financial system is in place but with some limitations. With the 
exception of Lithuania and Slovakia, it seems that these CEECs have to first overcome 
corporate governance issues such as weak to moderate bankruptcy legislation, moderate to 
high bureaucracy quality and the lack of tight credit and subsidy policies. Once this is 
accomplished, firms seeking equity financing have a better chance of experiencing lower, and 
therefore, more acceptable transaction costs. 
The last two CEECs, Bulgaria and Romania, ‘confirm’ their position of laggards in 
terms of the transition toward an institutional environment supportive of a sound banking 
system and possibly equity oriented financial system. By 2008, when the best CEE 
performing countries achieve institutional conditions comparable to other developed 
industrialised economies, Bulgaria and Romania have a comprehensive programme for 
implementation of privatisation in place but not all their enterprises are privatised, struggle to 
strengthen competition and corporate governance, and lack a regulatory system necessary for 
the functioning of non-bank financial institutions. Unless these conditions improve, equity 
culture development is not feasible as high transaction costs are an obstacle for firms 
diverting from the usual sources of financing to a riskier alternative - equity financing. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper serves as a conceptual discussion of equity culture and its creation mechanism. 
We believe that the conceptualisation itself can be regarded as a valuable theoretical 
contribution in its field. Equity culture is a less popular source of finance in the CEECs but 
yet developed in a number of developed economies. The way these economies, i.e. CEECs, 
will proceed is a dynamic and challenging issue to observe. 
 We graphically displayed ten CEECs from our research sample and four benchmarks 
in terms of their institutional characteristics and thus cumulatively, we believe, portrayed the 
status of their financial system developments and equity culture creation. The Co-Plot applied 
to create the exhibits, enabled us firstly, to identify indicators leading to debt financing and 
equity financing; and secondly, to place individual CEECs not only in terms of their general 
financial system development credibility but also in relation to equity culture creation. 
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 Evidence from business related publications (e.g. LSE, 2006, WorldBank, 2002) as 
well as our personal observations from the world of finance suggest that the financial system 
development in Central and Eastern Europe and specifically the subject of equity culture are 
important current issues. The question of which CEECs have the best potential to develop 
and adopt an equity culture requires attention so that correct and suitable policy implications 
can be proposed.  
 Both domestic governments in the CEECs and also the European Commission are 
concerned with improving economic growth rates of European member states. Our research 
identifies those countries which are lagging behind in terms of equity culture development 
and further, suggests causes of this. This research should give an impetus to countries to 
continue with the reforms necessary. 
 Organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The World Bank and 
regional development banks such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Intra-
American Development Bank (IADB) are concerned with economic development of 
transition economies. Our study identifies key factors in the development of an equity culture 
in the CEECs which may be applied to other groups of transition countries. We believe that 
our research and methodology will be of considerable interest to this group of international 
finance and development institutions. 
We find that the presence of an efficient bureaucratic system and an institutional system 
with low corruption levels is a necessary condition for equity culture development. This is to 
say that transition countries which do not satisfy the institutional conditions of efficient 
bureaucracy and low corruption can still have certain firms demanding equity finance. 
However, in such institutional conditions only a small proportion of firms will move towards 
developing equity culture. Therefore, if a country’s government aims to start building equity 
culture at all levels of its corporate sector, improved quality of the bureaucratic system and 
low levels of corruption may enable them to achieve this. 
Now that the conceptualisation is in place, the main external forces which affect equity 
culture development have been identified, the conditions which have to be satisfied so that 
equity culture can develop have been named, and certain policy-making recommendations for 
the development of an equity culture have been proposed, the research focus can change from 
a macro-level to micro-level one and utilise further quantitative methods to provide a more 
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